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Inspecting the Mechanism: Leverage  
and the Great Recession in the Eurozone†
By Philippe Martin and Thomas Philippon*
We provide a comprehensive account of the dynamics of eurozone 
countries from 2000 to 2012. We analyze private leverage, fiscal 
policy, labor costs, and spreads, and we propose a model and an 
identification strategy to separate the impact of credit cycles, 
excessive government spending, and sudden stops. We then ask how 
periphery countries would have fared with different policies. We 
find that countries could have stabilized their employment if they 
had followed more conservative fiscal policies during the boom. 
Macroprudential policies and an early intervention by the central 
bank to prevent market segmentation and reduce fiscal austerity 
would also have significantly reduced the recession. (JEL E24, E32, 
E58, E62, F33, F42, H61)
The lesson to be learned from the crisis is that a currency union needs 
ironclad budget discipline to avert a boom-and-bust cycle in the first place. 
Sinn (2010)
On the eve of the crisis [Spain] had low debt and a budget surplus. 
Unfortunately, it also had an enormous housing bubble, a bubble made 
possible in large part by huge loans from German banks to their Spanish 
counterparts. 
Krugman (2012)
The situation of Spain is reminiscent of the situation of emerging econ-
omies that have to borrow in a foreign currency (…) they can suddenly 
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be confronted with a “sudden stop” when capital inflows suddenly stop 
leading to a liquidity crisis. 
De Grauwe (2011)
Countries which lost competitiveness prior to the crisis experienced the 
lowest growth after the crisis. 
Bini Smaghi (2013)
These quotes illustrate a persistent disagreement about the best way to inter-
pret the eurozone crisis. Some argue that the crisis stems from a lack of fiscal 
discipline, some emphasize excessive private leverage, while others focus on 
sudden stops or competitiveness divergence due to fixed exchange rates. Most 
observers understand that all these factors have played a role, but do not offer a 
way to quantify their respective importance. In this context it is difficult to frame 
policy prescriptions on macroeconomic policies and on reforms of the eurozone. 
Moreover, given the scale of the crisis, understanding the dynamics of the euro-
zone is one of the major challenges for macroeconomics today. In this context, 
we propose a quantitative model to understand the dynamics of countries within 
the eurozone.
We analyze the dynamics of private debt, fiscal policy, and funding costs in a 
collection of small open economies within a monetary union. Each economy has 
an independent fiscal authority and is populated by patient and impatient agents. 
Impatient agents borrow from patient agents at home and abroad, and are subject to 
time-varying borrowing limits. Governments borrow, tax, and spend. Funding costs 
are linked to private and public debt sustainability. Nominal wages adjust slowly and 
changes in nominal expenditures affect employment.
The ultimate goal of this paper is to perform counterfactual experiments. For 
instance, we want to understand what would have happened to a particular country 
if it had run a different fiscal or macroprudential policy during the boom years, or if 
the eurozone had been able to prevent sudden stops. Our contribution is to propose a 
model and an identification strategy to provide a quantitative answer to these ques-
tions. Needless to say, this is a difficult task that requires several steps: (i) specify a 
model and collect the data; (ii) find an identification strategy; (iii) run counterfactual 
experiments.
It is important to emphasize that we focus on the dynamics of each country rela-
tive to the eurozone average. This approach helps us identify the model by netting 
out some aspects of monetary policy and exchange rate fluctuations. For instance, 
we seek to explain relative employment and inflation in Spain, but not aggregate 
employment and inflation in the eurozone.
To perform these counterfactual experiments, we need to quantify the mecha-
nisms that caused the recessions in different countries. But the three mechanisms 
we focus on—private debt, fiscal policy, and funding costs—are all endogenous 
equilibrium objects. We need to go further and identify sudden stop shocks, credit 
cycle shocks, and discretionary fiscal choices. All of these shocks affect interest 
rates, private and public debt dynamics, and, via general equilibrium effects and 
policy responses, output, wages, and employment. We therefore need an identifica-
tion strategy.
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Identification Strategy.—The strategy we propose is based on a combination of 
model-based restrictions, instrumental variable regressions, and the use of US states 
as a control group.
We specify the decision rule that pins down government spending and transfers 
as a function of the state of the economy. We assume that the government seeks to 
stabilize employment near its natural rate, cuts spending and transfers in response to 
an increase in borrowing costs and in response to an increase in public debt, and is 
subject to a country-specific political economy spending and transfer bias. The first 
three components of the decision rule are the same in all countries. The last com-
ponent contains one parameter per country, which is the bias needed to reconcile 
actual and predicted average spending and transfers during the boom. We estimate a 
political economy bias in the four periphery countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal) which is especially large in Greece.
We then model sudden stops as a common risk factor that increases after 2008, 
and we show that it materializes in countries with high public and private debts, 
including implicit liabilities linked to bank recapitalization costs. We use instrumen-
tal variables to estimate the impact of public and private debts on the economy’s cost 
of funds, assuming that governments did not anticipate that a crisis would come at 
the end of the boom.
The last identification issue is the most difficult. We need to ascertain how the 
sudden stop affects the dynamics of private debt. This is complicated because private 
deleveraging can happen even without sudden stop and because we are not willing to 
impose the same restrictions regarding functional forms and anticipations on private 
agents as we impose on governments. Our key idea instead is to use the United States 
as a control group. The US experience is both similar and different from the eurozone 
experience. A salient feature of the Great Recession in both monetary unions is that 
regions that have experienced large swings in private borrowing have also experi-
enced large declines in employment and output. Figure 1 shows that the change in 
households’ debt-to-income ratios during the boom (2003–2007) predicts the change 
in employment during the private credit crunch (2007–2010).1 The important point 
for our purpose is that, until 2010, the US and European experiences look strikingly 
similar. In both cases, there is a significant dispersion of leverage and employment, a 
very good fit, and (almost) the same slopes. This suggests similar structural parame-
ters governing the endogenous propagation mechanism.
A significant difference between the two regions appears only after 2010 when 
the eurozone experiences sudden stops, financial fragmentation, and sovereign debt 
crises coupled with the risk of a breakup of the currency union.2 States within the 
United States do not experience sudden stops and no such breakup risk, but they 
reduce their private leverage nonetheless. Our identification strategy is then to use 
actual private debt dynamics across the United States to construct predicted debt 
series across  eurozone  countries. We argue that these are the private debt dynamics 
1 The figure is for the largest US states and eurozone countries. State-level household debt for the United States 
comes from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York: see Midrigan and Philippon (2010). The mean changes are 
different since the private boom/bust cycle is a bit larger in the United States, but this is not an issue for us since, 
as explained earlier, we focus on dynamics relative to the average. 
2 Sudden stops were frequent in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but we do not know of any other histori-
cal example of a sudden stop inside of a monetary union. See Accominotti and Eichengreen (2016).
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that would have prevailed in the eurozone without financial fragmentation and sud-
den stop. Importantly, these predicted debt series are far from constant and failure to 
recognize this fact would lead to severe biases in the estimations of the true causes 
of the eurozone crisis.
Data Fit of the Model and Counterfactual Experiments.—Our model therefore 
features endogenous private debt, fiscal policy, and cost of funds. The exogenous 
driving forces are a time-varying risk of sudden stop (one time series), country- 
specific political economy biases (one number per country), and the predicted pri-
vate debt series (one time series per country). We show that this model fits the data 
well. Given the exogenous driving forces, the model predicts well the relative paths 
of gross domestic product (GDP), employment, inflation, spreads, net exports, and 
public debt from 2000 to 2012. This is a demanding exercise since we ask the model 
to predict the booms, the turning points, and the busts for all the series and all the 
countries.
Using our model, we then perform four counterfactual experiments on the four 
periphery countries (Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal). We first ask how these 
countries would have fared if they had followed more conservative fiscal policies 
during the boom. To do so, we shut down the political economy bias of our model. 
We find that such policies lead to lower spreads and less fiscal austerity during the 
bust. Periphery countries partially stabilize their employment. This is especially true 
for Greece, and to a lesser extent for Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. For Ireland, how-
ever, this more conservative policy requires buying back the entire stock of public 
debt, which suggests that fiscal policy is unlikely to be sufficient as a stabilization 
tool against a large credit boom.
We then ask how these countries would have fared if they had conducted 
 macroprudential policies to limit the increase in private debt. This policy stabilizes 
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Figure 1. First Stage of the Great Recession: Household Borrowing Predicts Employment Bust  
in the United States and the Eurozone
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private demand and therefore employment, and it reduces the need for bank recapi-
talization, leading to lower spreads and more room for countercyclical fiscal policy, 
especially in Ireland and Spain.
Our third experiment uncovers an interesting interaction between fiscal and 
 macroprudential policies. A biased government substitutes public debt for private 
debt in response to restrictive macroprudential policy, thereby undoing some of the 
macroprudential benefits. This suggests a complementarity between fiscal rules and 
macroprudential rules. Indeed, we find that a combination of conservative fiscal 
and macroprudential policies in the boom would have been successful in stabilizing 
employment and debt.
In a fourth counterfactual experiment, we assume that the European Central 
Bank’s (ECB) Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program (and Mario 
Draghi’s “Whatever It Takes” speech) is announced in 2008 rather than in 2012. 
This reduces the risk of a breakup of the eurozone, prevents the increase in spreads 
and financial fragmentation, reduces fiscal austerity, and allows the four periphery 
countries to stabilize employment after 2010. The experience of the eurozone then 
becomes similar a well functioning monetary union such as the United States with a 
recession due to private deleveraging (especially in Spain and Ireland) in 2008 but 
with a pickup in growth starting in 2010.
Literature Review.—Our paper is most directly related to three lines of research: 
macroeconomic models with credit frictions, in particular that of Eggertsson and 
Krugman (2012); open-economy models with interest rates shocks, as in Neumeyer 
and Perri (2005); and analyses of the eurozone crisis such as, for instance, Lane 
(2012).
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), and Gertler 
and Kiyotaki (2010) consider credit constraints that limit corporate investment, while 
we put more emphasis on household credit, as in Mian and Sufi (2014), Midrigan 
and Philippon (2010), and Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). This difference matters 
mostly when we fit the model with cross-sectional data. A striking feature of the 
data is the strong correlation between household leverage and employment at the 
micro level. Mian and Sufi (2014) show that differences in household debt overhang 
explains why unemployment is higher in some counties than in others. These facts 
are not easily explained by a local lending channel or by credit constraints that oper-
ate only at the firm level, presumably because business lending is not very localized 
in the United States.3
The literature on sudden stops in emerging markets focuses on the rapid imposi-
tion of an external credit constraint, and usually emphasizes Fisherian amplification 
when debts and incomes are denominated in different currencies (see Christiano, 
Gust, and Roldos 2004; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan 2005; Mendoza and Smith 
2006; Mendoza 2010; Korinek and Mendoza 2013). The sudden stops themselves 
3 Mian and Sufi (2010) find that the predictive power of household borrowing remains the same in counties 
dominated by national banks. It is also well known that businesses entered the recession with historically strong 
balance sheets and were able to draw on existing credit lines, as shown by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). On the 
other hand, our model is perfectly consistent with firm-level credit constraints in addition to household-level credit 
constraints, as discussed recently by Giroud and Mueller (2015). Our approach is also consistent with the lending 
constraints view of Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2015). 
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can be explained by multiple equilibria in international financial markets with trans-
action costs, as in Martin and Rey (2006). By contrast, we focus on countries that 
belong to a monetary union and our model integrates, for the first time to our knowl-
edge, both domestic and external debt dynamics. This is critical for understand-
ing the eurozone crisis since, as we have explained, private deleveraging would 
have created a recession even without an external credit constraint. In Neumeyer 
and Perri (2005), interest rates shocks, either exogenous or induced by productivity 
shocks, generate sudden stops and current account reversals because they induce 
a working capital shortage. In our model, the increase in interest rates generates a 
demand shock through a fall in private and public expenditures.
While most of the sudden stop literature has emphasized credit constraints, 
Gopinath (2004) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) have focused on total factor pro-
ductivity (TFP) shocks. In Aguiar and Gopinath (2007), a negative shock to trend 
growth leads to a fall in consumption and an increase in the trade balance.4 TFP 
shocks are certainly important in emerging markets, but they do not seem to explain 
the dynamics of euro area countries during the great recession (see Gavilán et al. 
2011 on this issue as well as the role of demographic factors in Spain). Countries 
hit by sudden stops (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal) do not experience the 
largest reversals in trend TFP growth, and there is no correlation between changes 
in TFP growth and employment losses during the recession (see Figure 3 in online 
Appendix B1). In fact, the only country that shows signs of TFP growth during the 
boom years is Greece, but the reliability of these numbers is questionable.
Our paper is related to the literature on sovereign credit risk (see Eaton and 
Gersovitz 1982; Arellano 2008; and Aguiar and Amador 2014 for a survey) but we 
do not actually model strategic default decisions. We focus instead on how sovereign 
default risk affects the real economy. Corsetti et al. (2013) model such a sovereign 
risk channel through which sovereign default risk raises the private sector cost of 
funds. A high cost of funds forces the government to cut spending and our model is 
qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the recent research on fiscal multipli-
ers at the regional level (see Nakamura and Steinsson 2014; Farhi and Werning 2013).
The papers by Lane (2012) and Shambaugh (2012) provide a thorough descrip-
tion of the four dimensions of the eurozone crisis: public debt, private debt, sud-
den stop, and competitiveness. The specific role of the boom/bust cycle in capital 
flows is analyzed by Lane (2013) while Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) show that 
domestic credit expansion is the most robust predictor of financial crises. Battistini, 
Pagano, and Simonelli (2014) argue that the perceived risk of a eurozone breakup is 
a key driver of financial fragmentation during the crisis. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
(2016) emphasize the role of downward wage rigidity. Some papers also com-
pare and describe the specific circumstances of individual countries. Fernández 
Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos (2013) argue that loose financing conditions and 
capital inflows following the creation of the euro relaxed the pressure for reforms in 
4 Gopinath (2004) proposes a model with a search friction to generate asymmetric responses to symmetric 
shocks. A search friction in foreign investors’ entry decision into emerging markets creates an asymmetry in the 
adjustment process of the economy: An increase in traded sector productivity raises GDP on impact, and it contin-
ues to grow to a higher long-run level. On the other hand, a decline in traded sector productivity causes GDP to con-
tract in the short run by more than it does in the long run. Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) do not study the response of 
the labor market but it is well known that income effects tend move consumption and hours in opposite directions. 
1910 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW july 2017
the four periphery countries. Reis (2013) argues that capital misallocation explains 
the low growth of Portugal between 2000 and 2007 and Gopinath et al. (2015) show 
the link between capital inflows and low productivity due to misallocation in some 
periphery countries. Whelan (2014) stresses the role of cheap credit and lax bank-
ing regulation in Ireland, and Cuñat and Guadalupe (2009) analyzes the lending 
behavior of the Spanish Cajas in the run up to the crisis. Gourinchas, Philippon, and 
Vayanos (2017) focus on Greece. While our model cannot do justice to the specific-
ities of every single country, it nonetheless gives a quantitative interpretation of the 
crisis that is consistent with many of the views expressed in these various papers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present the 
model and in Section II we describe the calibration and empirical identification strat-
egies as well as the fit of the structural model. The structural model is used to conduct 
our counterfactual experiments in Section III. Section IV concludes. There are also 
several online Appendices presenting the simulations, some details of the model, the 
data sources, and the various adjustments that need to be made to the raw data.
I. Model
The basic structure of the model follows Galí and Monacelli (2008). We study a 
set of small open economies in a monetary union. Each country (or region)  j pro-
duces a tradable good and is populated by households who consume the domestic 
good and a basket of foreign goods. Each country in the monetary union is small 
in the sense that country-specific shocks do not affect aggregate dynamics.5 Saving 
and borrowing can be done domestically and internationally and are measured in 
units of the common currency. We also abstract from housing and from corporate 
investment.6 Sections IA to ID present the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model. Section IE departs from the DSGE approach and posits equations 
that we later estimate with instrumental variables.
A. Government
The government of country  j imposes a flat and constant tax  τ j on income, 
spends  G j, t on goods and services and makes social transfers  T j, t . In our notations, 
both  G and  T are nominal values. Let  B j, t−1 g be the face value (in units of the com-
mon currency) of the debt issued at time  t − 1 and due at time  t . The nominal budget 
constraint of the government is
(1)   B j, t 
g  ____ R j, t +  τ j  Y j, t =  G j, t +  T j, t +  B j, t−1 
g ,
5 To be clear, this means that foreign demand for the goods produced by region  j does not depend on the GDP of 
region  j . This assumption greatly simplifies our analysis. Given our focus on Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece 
in the counterfactuals, we believe that direct trade spillovers are probably not very large, except perhaps between 
Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, financial spillovers may not be small even if a country is small relative to the 
currency union. For instance, suppose that Greece had improved its fiscal situation earlier, then perhaps risk premia 
on Portugal would have risen by less, and this in turn might have reduced the sudden stop in Greece. Our model 
misses this kind of financial feedback, and our estimates of gains from counterfactual policies that lead to reduced 
spreads are therefore probably biased downward. 
6 See Midrigan and Philippon (2010) for a model with housing, and Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos (2017) 
for a model with investment. 
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where  Y j, t is nominal GDP and  R j, t is the nominal interest rate. We assume that the 
government spends only on domestic goods.
B. Households
Following Mankiw (2000) and more recently Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), 
we assume that households are heterogeneous in their degree of time preference. 
More precisely, in region  j , there is a fraction  χ j of impatient households, and  1 −  χ j 
of patient ones. Patient households will be net savers in equilibrium. They are indexed 
by  i = s for savers and have a higher discount factor than borrowers, indexed by 
i = b :  β ≡  β s >  β b . Household  i in country  j maximizes lifetime utility
  피 0  ∑ 
t=0
∞
  β i t(log  C i, j, t −   N i, j, t 
1+φ  _____
1 + φ ) , 
where
  log  C i, j, t =  α j log (  C i, j, t h  _____ α j  ) +  (1 −  α j ) log (  C i, j, t 
f  _____
1 −  α j  ) 
and  C i, j, t h is consumption of home good and  C i, j, t f is consumption of (a basket of) 
foreign goods;  N i, j, t is labor of household  i in country  j . With these preferences, 
households of region  j spend a fraction  α j of their income on home goods, and 
1 −  α j on foreign goods. There are alternative modeling choices to introduce a mea-
sure of openness such as trade costs or the introduction of a non-traded sector. Our 
modeling choice is the simplest although it means we cannot discuss issues such 
as the resource misallocation between the tradable and the nontradable sectors (see 
Gopinath et al. 2015 on this issue).
Let  X i, j, t ≡  P j, t  C i, j, t h +  P t f  C i, j, t f denote nominal spending. The Euler equation of 
patient households is
(2)  1 _____  X s, j, t =  피 t [ β  R j, t  _______ X s, j, t+1  ] ,
where  R j, t is the nominal return between  t and  t + 1 . We will explain later how the 
cost of funds depends on the risk of a sudden stop. Savers are residual claimants in 
the economy and they own the domestic firms. Impatient households are subject to 
the borrowing limit  B j, t h :
(3)  B j, t ≤  B j, t h ,
and their budget constraint is7
(4)  X b, j, t =   B j, t  ____ R j, t +  (1 −  τ j )  W j, t  N b, j, t +  T b, j, t −  B j, t−1 ,  
7 Notice that the budget constraint for the borrowers is written without the possibility of default. In such a case, 
and without taking into account issues of market liquidity, the cost of fund is the same as the interest rate. When we 
discuss the model, we therefore refer to  R j, t as the interest rate. But when we turn to the data, it is obviously critical 
to remember that  R j, t is really meant to capture the cost of funds. 
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where  W j, t are nominal wages. We explain later how the debt limit  B j, t h evolves. We 
consider equilibria where shocks are not too large and the borrowing constraint (3) 
holds with equality. Note that borrowers do not own shares so their only income is 
labor income.8 Finally, aggregate private spending is
(5)  X j, t =  χ j  X b, j, t +  (1 −  χ j )  X s, j, t . 
C. Market Clearing
The market clearing constraint for domestic goods is
(6)  Y j, t =  α j  X j, t +  F j, t +  G j, t ,
where  F j, t are nominal exports. Notice that we assume here that foreign demand for 
the home good has a unit elasticity with respect to export price  P j, t h . As a result  F j, t is 
exogenous from the perspective of country  j . Production is linear in labor  N j, t :
(7)  Y j, t =  P j, t  N j, t . 
We will describe shortly how wages and prices are set. Nominal exports are  F j, t 
and nominal imports are  (1 −  α j )  X j, t since the government does not buy imported 
goods, so net exports are
(8)  E j, t =  F j, t −  (1 −  α j )  X j, t . 
Let  A j, t be the net foreign asset position of the country at the end of period  t . The 
current account is then simply9
(9)   A j, t  ____ R j, t −  A j, t−1 =  E j, t . 
D. Scaling, Spreads, and Inflation
An important point of our analysis is that we study the dynamics of the different 
regions relative to the eurozone average. This allows us to abstract from common 
aggregate shocks. To take advantage of this idea, we measure deviations from the 
eurozone average, denoted by  ∗ , as
(10)  x s, j, t ≡   X s, j, t  _____ X s, t ∗  
8 We also let the transfer be type-specific to make sure that labor supply is the same for all agents in steady state. 
This is a very small adjustment that simplifies the notations of the model because we do not need to keep track of 
two quantities of labor. 
9 Denoting  S j, t the patient agents’ saving, Walras’ law then implies the savers’ budget constraint:  X s, j, t =  (1 −  τ j )  [ ( P j, t −  W j, t ) / (1 −  χ j ) ]  N j, t +  (1 −  τ j )  W j, t  N s, j, t +  T s, j, t +  S j, t−1 −  S j, t / R j, t which states that savers 
income comes from net of tax profits received from firms, labor income, and transfers. 
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for relative savers spending (in lower case), and similarly for all our macroeconomic 
variables. We define the funding cost spread as
(11)  ρ j, t ≡   R j, t  ____ R t ∗ − 1,  
where  R t ∗ is the interest rate for the monetary union as a whole. Finally, we assume 
a standard New-Keynesian model of price and wage dynamics à la Calvo, following 
the textbook treatment in Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008). Let  w j, t be the log-real 
wage (deflated by the consumer price index (CPI)). For domestic relative log-price 
inflation  π j, t h we have
(12)  π j, t h = β  피 t [ π j, t+1 h ] +  λ p ( w j, t −  (1 −  α j ) log  p j, t h ) . 
Similarly, in the labor market, a representative union sets wages and we have
(13)  π j, t w = β  피 t [ π j, t+1 w ] +  λ w (log  c j, t + φ log   n j, t  ___ n –j  −  w j, t ) ,
  π j, t =  α j  π j, t h ,
  w j, t =  w j, t−1 +  π j, t w −  π j, t ,
where  π j, t w is log-wage inflation and  π j, t is log-CPI inflation.10 Note that we have 
differenced out foreign inflation (equivalently, normalized the foreign price to one) 
so  − p j, t h really measures the terms of trade. There are a few important points to dis-
cuss about this specification.11 First, we assume that the natural rate  n –j is constant 
within country. This is probably not a good assumption for Germany following the 
Hartz labor market reforms of 2003–2005, and indeed our model underpredicts rel-
ative employment in Germany. But in other countries it seems to work fine. Another 
important assumption is that  ( λ p ,  λ w ) is the same in all regions. This assumption 
is motivated by existing research, notably Montoya and Döhring (2011) who find 
fairly similar Phillips curve coefficients across eurozone countries.12
E. Three Driving Forces
We now describe the three mechanisms that are at the core of our analysis of the 
eurozone crisis. The first one is a boom/bust cycle in private debt, which we call 
10 The inflation elasticities are defined as usual:  λ p ≡  [ (1 −  ϑ p ) (1 − β  ϑ p ) ] / ϑ p and  λ w ≡  ( [ (1 − β  ϑ w ) ×  (1 −  ϑ w ) ] / ϑ w ) (1/ (1 + φ  ϵ w ) ) where  ϑ p and  ϑ w are the Calvo stickiness probabilities, and  ϵ w is the elasticity of 
substitution between different types of labor inputs. 
11 Note that all households work the same amount. As explained earlier, we normalize relative transfers so that 
the steady-state labor supply is the same for borrowers and savers. We maintain this assumption in the dynamics 
by rationing the labor market uniformly across households. See Midrigan and Philippon (2010) for a discussion. 
12 Montoya and Döhring (2011, p. 18) find that the estimates for the Member States “are fairly well in line with 
the estimates for the euro area aggregate.” For the main coefficient of interest, only two countries have estimates 
above or below one standard deviation of the euro area estimate. Importantly, there is no geographical pattern in the 
distribution of the coefficients, which we interpret as saying that the differences are probably just noise. 
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credit cycle for short. The second one is a political economy bias in government 
spending that creates fiscal imbalances. The third is a sudden stop that threatens the 
stability of the eurozone.
In each case, we argue that the driving forces have an endogenous component 
and an exogenous component. We do not provide microfoundations for this part 
of the model. Given the range of data and economic forces that we need to cap-
ture, this is not feasible. Our choices of modeling of these three mechanisms are 
driven by the empirical feasibility of identification as well as by theoretical relations 
that have been discussed in the literature. For example, as in Corsetti et al. (2013, 
2014), higher government debt (through past low output or high public expendi-
tures) increases spreads (sovereign and private) and in turn these spreads affect pri-
vate borrowing and the real activity. Contrary to Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014), we do 
not model precisely the feedback loop between the fiscal outlook (the probability 
of sovereign default) and public and private spreads but our modeling captures, in 
a reduced form, similar fundamental relations. In addition, our model captures how 
fiscal policy (and its countercyclical role) is constrained by spreads.
The Credit Cycle.—We assume that the household borrowing limit is given by
(14)  b j,t h =  b ˆ j,t h +  λ ρ,h ρ j,t 
where  λ ρ, h is a (negative) parameter,  ρ j, t captures the impact of the (relative) funding 
costs on the (relative) private credit market, and  b ˆ j, t h is the (relative) credit cycle that 
would prevail even without financial segmentation. The spread  ρ j, t is endogenous 
and depends, among other things, on private and public leverage. We will explain in 
details how we can use the United States to construct  b ̂ j, t h and how we estimate  λ ρ, h 
using instrumental variables.
The Political Economy Bias.—We assume that the government follows a fiscal 
rule for expenditures  g j, t and transfers  t j, t :
(15)  g j,t =  g ̃j,t +  γ n ( n j,t −  n –j ) +  γ ρ ρ j,t +  γ ρ, b g  b j,t g ,
  t j,t =  t ̃ j,t +  γ n ( n j,t −  n –j ) +  γ ρ ρ j,t +  γ ρ, b g  b j,t g ,
where  γ n ,  γ ρ , and  γ ρ,  b g  are all negative parameters. The rule has three components. 
The first is an exogenous country-specific political economy bias  g ̃j, t and  t ̃j, t . The 
second corresponds to an objective to stabilize employment  n j, t close to its natural 
level  n –j . The third is a funding constraint that forces the government to cut spending 
when the spread  ρ j, t is positive or when public debt  b j, t g is high. The parameter  γ ρ 
plays an important role in our analysis, while  γ ρ,  b g  is only needed to ensure long run 
stability of the system, and can be small.
The Sudden Stop.—We assume that the country-specific spread in funding costs 
is given by
(16)  ρ j,t =  σ t ×  [ λ 0 ρ +  λ g,ρ  b j,t g +  λ h,ρ b j,t h +  λ rec,ρ recap j,t ] +  λ a a j,t ,
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where  σ t captures the aggregate time-varying risk of a sudden stop. This equation 
says that funding costs start to diverge when there is a sudden stop in the eurozone 
and that the extent to which this happens in different countries depends on pub-
lic debt  b j, t g , private debt  b j, t h , and the recapitalization needs of the financial sector ( reca p j, t ).13 In addition, we introduce a small effect of net foreign assets to ensure 
long run stationarity.14 The sensitivity of spreads to these common and local factors 
is measured by the parameters  λ . This is a fairly standard equation that emphasizes 
the interaction between a common risk factor ( σ t ) and local sensitivities (debt lev-
els). The time-varying risk is needed to explain rapid changes in spreads while debt 
levels tend to be very persistent. The local sensitivities are needed because not all 
countries are hit by sudden stops. Our specification captures financial frictions asso-
ciated with high leverage (debt overhang, risk shifting, adverse selection, runs, etc.).
In the model, we assume that recapitalization needs are driven by nonperforming 
loans (NPL) and depend on an exogenous shock  ξ j,t and on the amount of private 
credit extended by the banks in past years, relative to steady state  b 
–
j h :
(17)  recap j,t =  ξ j,t (1 + κ ( b j,t−1 h −  b j h ) ) ,
which says that a reduction of past private debt by one euro reduces future recap-
italization needs by a factor  κ . The lag  l could be 1 or more depending on the 
application.15 We choose a particular lag structure that fits the data well in our 
 macroprudential counterfactual experiment in Section IIIB.
F. Equilibrium
To summarize, our model has six exogenous driving forces:  b ˆ j,t 
h
 ,  g ̃j,t ,  t ̃j,t ,  σ t ,  ξ j,t ,  f j,t . 
All of these are assumed to be autoregressive processes. An equilibrium of the 
model is then a sequence for the exogenous driving forces and for the endogenous 
variables  (c, n, w, p,  … ) that satisfies the equations of the model (1) to (14), as well 
as the structural equations (14) to (17).
The most important driving forces are the private credit cycle  b ˆ j,t 
h
 , government 
spending ( g ̃j,t ,  t ̃j,t ), and the sudden stop  σ t . We will spend much time explaining 
exactly how we measure these shocks and how we estimate equations (14), (15), and 
(16). By contrast relative foreign demand  f j,t does not play a big role and is included 
only because it reduces the noise in the estimation. Financial markets clearly pay 
attention to recapitalization expenditures and the shock  ξ j,t helps us match the timing 
of the release of information about bank losses and therefore the timing of spread 
13 Favero (2013) also finds that fiscal fundamentals matter for eurozone spreads in interaction with the 
time-varying perceived risk of a eurozone breakup. 
14 It is well known that net foreign assets are not stationary in a small open economy. To solve this issue, we 
follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) and assume a small penalty on spreads for deviating from a long-run NFA/
GDP ratio. 
15 Equation (17) is the simplest one that fits the data. We could also estimate an equation that predicts non-
performing loans using outstanding debt relative to disposable income, as in Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos 
(2017). This would not change our analysis because the main virtue of equation (17) is to capture differences 
between countries in the timing of the release of information about bank losses. This then helps explain the with-
in-country timing of spreads in equation (16). 
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increases. Our main conclusions, however, are not sensitive to the inclusion of  recap j,t 
because they are driven by variations in  b j, t h across our  counterfactual experiments.
II. Calibration and Empirical Identification
For the simulation, we use data from 11 eurozone countries for the period 2000 
to 2012: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, and Portugal, and calibrate the shocks on the observed data. The data 
sources are described in online Appendix B1.
A. Calibration
The parameters used in the simulations are presented in Table 1. The discount 
factor (of patient households) and the Philipps curve parameter are standard. The 
country-specific parameters (share of credit-constrained households  χ j , and degree 
of home bias  α j ) are shown in Figure 2.
For the country-specific domestic share of consumption,  α j , we rely on Bussiere et al. (2011) who compute the total import content of consumption expenditures, including 
the value of indirect imports. For our sample of countries, the average implied domes-
tic share in 2005 (the latest date in their study) is 72.7 percent. The lowest is 66.4 per-
cent for Belgium and the highest is 78.7 percent for Italy. For foreign demand  F j, t , 
given the absence of an intermediate goods sector in our model, we take the domes-
tic value-added that is associated with final consumption in the rest of the world, 
which corresponds to value-added-based exports. As detailed in online Appendix B1, 
we use the data from the OECD-WTO Trade in Value-Added (TiVA) initiative to 
measure this. The scaled value-added based exports are shown in Figure 8 in online 
Appendix B3. Finally, we take into account net EU transfers, which are the difference 
between EU spending in the country and the country contribution to the European 
Union. In our model, such transfers play exactly the same role as foreign demand, so 
we add European Union net transfers to exports in the goods market equation.
Share of Constrained Households.—For the country-specific share of credit- 
constrained households,  χ j , we use a measure based on the Eurosystem Household 
Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS).16 For each country, we use the fraction 
16 The survey took place in 2010. In Greece and Spain, the data were collected in 2009 and 2008–2009, respec-
tively. This survey has been used recently by Kaplan, Violante, and Weidner (2014) to quantify the share of hand-to-
mouth households. They define these as consumers who spend all of their available resources in every pay-period, 
Table 1—Parameters
Parameter name Value
Annual discount factor (patient)  β 0.98
Home bias  α j country-specific
Share of impatient households  χ j country-specific
Calvo parameters  ϑ p and  ϑ w 0.5
Frisch elasticity  φ −1 1
Persistence of spreads shocks  θ 0.5
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of households with liquid assets below two months of total household gross income 
to approximate the share of credit-constrained households.17 The average for our 
set of countries is 48 percent with a maximum of 64.8 percent for Greece and a 
minimum of 34.7 percent for Austria. Ireland did not participate in the survey so for 
this country we use the average of the eurozone. Note that  b j, t h in the model is debt 
per impatient household so the counterpart to the empirical measure of aggregate 
debt is  χ j  b j, t h .
Funding Costs.—The cost of fund  ρ j, t enters the Euler equation of unconstrained 
agents. It represents the expected return of savers, the funding cost of firms, etc. The 
true cost of funds is not directly observable and we base our estimates on several 
interest rates: (i) loans rates for small and medium enterprises (SMEs); (ii) deposit 
rates; (iii) wholesale bank funding costs; and (iv) yields on ten-year government 
bonds. In all cases we compute the difference between the rate in country  j and the 
median of the eurozone in year  t .
The link between interest rate spreads and funding costs can be complicated. On 
the one hand, interest rates are not expected returns because they include expected 
credit losses. On the other hand, we know from a large literature in finance that 
and hence do not carry any wealth across periods. They argue that measuring this behavior using data on net worth 
(as consistent with heterogeneous-agent macroeconomic models) is misleading because this misses what they call 
the wealthy hand-to-mouth households. These are households who hold sizable amounts of wealth in illiquid assets 
(such as housing or retirement accounts), but very little or no liquid wealth, and therefore consume all of their 
disposable income every period. They define hand-to-mouth consumers as those households in the survey whose 
average balances of liquid wealth are positive but equal to or less than one-half of their earnings. 
17 We thank Caterina Mendicino from the ECB who provided us with the data. At the eurozone level, the 
median household has 18.6 percent of its annual income (equivalent to just above two months’ income) available 
in the form of liquid assets (see ECB-HFCS 2013). Net liquid assets are the sum of deposits, mutual funds, bonds, 
non-self-employment business wealth, (publicly traded) shares and managed accounts, net of credit line/overdraft 
debt, credit card debt and other nonmortgage debt. 
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credit spreads create significant differences in funding costs. This is the basic point 
of all models with distress costs, agency costs, debt overhang, safety premia, etc. 
All of these models predict that funding costs are increasing in credit spreads, but 
less than  one-for-one. Banks clearly play a special role during the crisis. Many bor-
rowers depend on bank loans and the funding costs of banks are therefore critical 
for the economy. We use data on banks’ credit default swaps (CDSs) to estimate 
wholesale funding costs. Deposit rates are also informative even though they tend 
to move more slowly than market rates. They also depend on the credibility of the 
deposit insurance system. Debt overhang in the banking sector makes it more attrac-
tive for banks to invest in the debt of their home sovereign, and this can crowd out 
private lending.18 For tractability reasons, we collapse the banking sector with the 
rest of the private sector. Banks are potentially important for two reasons. First, 
banking losses can end up on the government balance sheet through recapitaliza-
tion needs. We capture this in our framework to the extent that the losses are driven 
by domestic loans. Our model can capture the issues of domestic nonperforming 
loans. This is probably a good model of losses in the periphery countries, since we 
think that banks’ capital shortfalls are indeed driven by domestic NPLs. This would 
not necessarily be a good model for Germany for instance, where German lenders 
made significant losses on their foreign operations. The second is the feedback from 
sovereign risk to banks’ funding costs. This is part of our model as well. The main 
drawback of not having an explicit banking sector is that we cannot address the 
welfare consequences of banks’ bailouts. In that sense, this is not so much that our 
counterfactuals are biased, it’s more that there are other interesting counterfactuals 
that we cannot perform.
We want our synthetic measure to be as broad as possible, so ideally we want to 
use the average of (i) loans rates for SMEs; (ii) deposit rates; and (iii) wholesale 
bank funding costs. Unfortunately we are severely constrained by data availability, 
as explained in online Appendix B1. The only series that are available for all coun-
tries and all years are the spreads on government bonds. We therefore project our 
three spreads (SME loans, deposits, wholesale funding) on the sovereign spreads 
and we take the average of the projected values:19
  ρ j, t ≡  1 __3( ˆ  SMEj, t +  ˆ  DEPOj, t +  ˆ  WHOLEj, t ) .
Figure 8 in online Appendix B3 shows the government bond spreads and our syn-
thetic measure  ρ j, t . They are of course strongly correlated, but the important point 
is that  ρ j, t is a lot less volatile than the government spread. In the case of Greece for 
instance, the sovereign spreads exceed 20 percent in some years, and this is clearly 
a reflection of credit risk. Using this raw number in the simulations would make no 
sense and would lead to too much volatility in spending. As we show below, our 
synthetic measure seems to perform reasonably well in the simulations.
18 In the limit of a model à la Myers (1977), the bank may end up treating the entire yield as an expected 
return because it only cares about the nondefault state. See Philippon and Schnabl (2013) for a discussion of debt 
overhang. 
19 We regress each of the country-specific interest spreads (loans for SMEs, deposit rates, and wholesale bank 
funding costs captured by CDS rates) on a piecewise linear function of the ten-year government bonds spread. We 
then take the simple average of the predicted values. 
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Finally, agents in our model need to have an estimate of the persistence parameter 
θ for the  ρ j, t series. A higher persistence amplifies the effect of a given spread shock 
because it increases its impact on the net present value of future income. It is clearly 
important to use a longer sample to estimate the persistence so we extend all our 
spreads series to 2014 and we estimate  θ by running a panel regression with year 
and country fixed effects. We estimate  θ to be 0.5, which means that if the spread is 
100bps this year, agents anticipate that it will be 50bps next year.
Scaling.—We scale the data in a manner consistent with equation (10). We con-
struct the following benchmark level of nominal GDP for country  j at time  t :
  Y ˆ j, t ≡   Y j,  t 0   ____ L j,  t 0   
 L –  t 0   __ Y – t 0   
 Y –t  __ L – t  L j, t , 
where  t 0 is the base year (2002 in our simulations),  Y j, t is nominal GDP,  L j, t is popu-
lation, and  Y 
–
t and  L – t denote the aggregate GDP and population for the eurozone. In 
words, the benchmark is the nominal GDP the country would have if it had the same 
per-capita growth rate as the eurozone together with its actual population growth. 
The key point is that the only country level time-varying variable that we take as 
exogenous is population growth. We scale all our variables in euros by the bench-
mark GDP. For GDP itself, we define
  y j, t ≡   Y j, t  ___ Y ˆ j, t , 
which is one in the base year. For sovereign debt, we define
  b j, t g ≡ log (  B j, t 
g  ___ Y ˆ j, t ) , 
which is equal to the actual debt to GDP ratio in the base year  t 0 , but then tracks the 
level of debt for  t >  t 0 , as in the model  b j, t g .20 This is important when we consider 
deleveraging. With large fiscal multipliers, a reduction in debt might leave the debt 
to GDP ratio unchanged in the short run. Ratios often give a misleading view of 
deleveraging efforts. Figure 6 in online Appendix B3 shows the scaled private and 
sovereign debt series. Figure 6 shows scaled public spending and transfers. Note 
also that government spending is adjusted for expenditures on bank recapitalization. 
For wages we use the unit labor cost relative to the average unit labor cost in the 
eurozone. For employment, we use employment per capita in deviation to the euro-
zone average and the base year:
  n i, t =   N j, t / L j, t ____________   N j, 2002 / L j, 2002  
 N j, 2002 ∗ / L j, 2002 ∗   ____________ N j, t ∗ / L j, t ∗  . 
20 Instead of using government debt directly from data, we construct a simulated government debt series in order 
to avoid including factors that affect government debt in the data but are not in the model, such as bank recapitaliza-
tions, default, revenues from privatizations, etc. The simulated debt series is constructed by adding to  t − 1 period 
debt government expenditures including interest payments and subtracting tax revenues. The tax rate  τ j is constant 
but different in each country. It is set such that the government budget constraint in the base year (2002) is satisfied. 
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B. Identification
Using the United States to Identify Private Debt Dynamics.—We now explain 
how we estimate equation (14). A serious identification challenge when we consider 
private debt dynamics is to distinguish what comes from sudden stops and what 
comes from a standard leverage cycle. It is clear that even without a sudden stop, 
those eurozone countries that had increased their private leverage during the boom 
would have experienced private deleveraging thereafter. But exactly how fast and 
how much, we do not know. It is also rather intuitive that places that experience the 
largest increase in debt during the boom experience the largest decrease during the 
bust. This makes it particularly difficult to identify the impact of the sudden stop. 
Our identification strategy is then to use the United States as a control group to esti-
mate what (relative) deleveraging without sudden stop should look like. We estimate 
the following model for deleveraging in a panel of US states:
  b j, t h, US =  α ̂ 1  b j, t−1 h, US +  ∑ 
k=2002, 2005, 2008
  α ̂ k  b j, k h, US +  ϵ j, t 
for  t = 2009, … , 2012, j = 1, … , 52 , and  b j, t h is household debt in state  j at time 
t , rescaled exactly as explained above for the eurozone.21 The idea is that these 
private leverage cycles reflect various global and financial factors: low real rates, 
financial innovations, regulatory arbitrage of the Basel rules by banks, real estate 
bubbles, bank governance, etc.22 To a large extent these forces are present both 
in Europe and in the United States. The main difference is that there was no sud-
den stop within the United States, and that there was never any risk of a breakup 
of the US monetary union. Hence, we interpret the US experience as representa-
tive of a deleveraging outcome in a monetary union without sudden stops and with 
zero spreads, which is consistent with the evidence (see, for instance, Hurst et al. 
2015).23 Our assumption is therefore that, if the eurozone had not experienced a 
sudden stop, the difference in private leverage between two eurozone countries (for 
example, Ireland and Germany) would have been reduced at the same speed as the 
difference between two US states (for example, California and Texas). Technically, 
we need the US-based estimate  b ̂ j, t h as a control in equation (14) and as an instru-
ment in equation (16). Notice that we do not need to assume that the aggregate 
private leverage cycle was the same in the United States and Europe, and we also do 
not need to assume that monetary policy was the same.
The estimated coefficients  α ̂ k capture the fact that states that accumulate more 
private debt during the boom and deleverage more during the bust. We then take the 
estimated coefficients  α ̂ k and use them to construct predicted deleveraging in euro-
zone countries  b ̂ j, t h that is used for the credit cycle shock in equation (14):
  b ̂ j, t h =  α ̂ 1  b j, t−1 h +  ∑ 
k=2002, 2005, 2008
  α ̂ k  b j, k h ,
21 One issue we have to deal with is that mortgage defaults are much more prevalent in the United States, 
because of differences in mortgage regulations. Deleveraging in the model does not happen via default, so we must 
add to the series of household debt in US states the amount of debt which has been defaulted upon. 
22 See Cuñat and Garicano (2010) on the case of Spain. 
23 We discuss differences in local fiscal policy in online Appendix B2. 
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for  t = 2009, … 2012 and  j = 1, … 11 .
Figure 3 illustrates the results for California and Ireland. Figure 3 suggests that 
the Irish private sector paid back its debts faster than one would expect if Ireland had 
been a US state. This is also the case for other countries that experienced a sudden 
stop.
Finally, we need to estimate the parameter  λ ρ, h in equation (14) on the period 
2008–2012 for the 11 eurozone countries. To do so, we use government debt in 
2007 as an instrument for  ρ j, t . Initial government debt is a good predictor of future 
spreads and we use 2007 to capture the part of debt that is not influenced by the 
crisis itself.24
Funding Costs, Sudden Stops, and Recapitalization.—To capture the possibility 
and the size of a sudden stop in the eurozone, we measure the coefficient  σ t as the 
mean of the observed absolute value of spreads in the eurozone. As expected, it is 
close to 0 up to 2007 and starts increasing in 2008 with a maximum in 2012. As for 
equation (14), we use instrumental variables to estimate equation (16). For govern-
ment and private debt  b j, t g and  b j, t h and recapitalization ( reca p j, t ), we use government 
debt levels ( b j, t g ) lagged three years, the exogenous component of private debt (and 
its lag) predicted by the US experience  b ̂ j, t h . We choose  λ a = −0.001 for the cost 
on the net foreign asset position (NFA) necessary to obtain a stationary net foreign 
asset position.
The estimated coefficients  λ in equations (14) and (16) estimated on the period 
2008–2012 for the 11 eurozone countries are shown in Table 2.
24 The main issue is that fiscal policy and private leverage react to the same shocks during the recession. This 
is why we measure government debt in 2007, before any increase in  ρ j, t . The remaining (probably less important) 
concern is that government debt in 2007 might be correlated with past increases in private debt. According to our 
fiscal rule, countries with high private debt growth should have tighter fiscal policy, and, all else equal, less gov-
ernment debt at the end of the boom. Indeed, there is a negative correlation between public and private debt across 
countries in 2007. Countries with less government debt are then also countries where there might be more of a need 
for private deleveraging. Note that this bias works against us because it pushes  λ ρ, h toward zero, but still, we want 
to address this issue. We do so in two ways. First, it is important to remember that we control for predicted private 
deleveraging using our US estimates, so we actually know which countries want to deleverage more. Second, we 
have constructed a model-based instrument by taking the level of debt in 2002 plus the model-based drifts  δ i g ,  δ i t. 
This instrument is the most consistent with our model. The drifts provide a theoretically valid instrument pre-
cisely because they capture the exogenous part of government expenditures and transfers. Using this instrument we 
find  λ ρ, h around −2.1 instead of −1.9. Since the estimated elasticity does not change much, we prefer to simply 
use public debt in 2007 because it is more transparent and can be readily replicated (while the other one requires 
using the model-based drifts). 
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One purpose of equation (17) is to capture differences between countries in the 
timing of the release of information about bank losses. This then helps explain the 
within-country timing of spreads in equation (16). In order to match the timing 
of recapitalization, we choose the shock  ξ j, t so that  reca  p j, t matches the observed 
recapitalization in the data. The second purpose of equation (17) is to perform the 
macroprudential counterfactual where we do not allow private leverage to increase 
during the boom years which in turn reduces recapitalization needs in the bust. What 
matters is that the size of recapitalization depends on the growth of private credit in 
the boom years, so it could be any function of lagged private credit ( b j, t−2 h ,  b j, t−3 h , … ). 
We interpret  b j, t−i h to be the private debt in 2007 at the end of the boom but this par-
ticular date does not matter directly for the estimation. The difference ( b j, t−i h −  b –j h ) 
in the equation (17) is then the difference between the chosen value in the particular 
simulation of  b j, t−i h at the end of the boom in 2007 and the observed value in 2007, 
( b j, 2007 h −  b j, 2007 h, data ). Note that, except in the macroprudential counterfactual, this dif-
ference is zero given that up to 2008,  b j, t h is simply the observed value of private 
debt. We then need to estimate the parameter  κ . Using a cross-sectional regression 
for equation (17), we estimate  κ to be 0.25.
Fiscal Policy.—Our strategy for equation (16) is different from the one we used 
with the previous two structural equations. When dealing with private debt choices 
and with market prices, we worry a lot about reverse causality and omitted variables, 
and we do not pretend that we know the true model. In the case of government pol-
icy, on the other hand, we are willing to impose stronger restrictions and rely on the 
model to interpret the data. So we impose the policy rule (16) and we choose param-
eters that best replicate the dynamics of spending, transfers, and debt.25 Obviously, 
we need to restrict the country-specific shocks  g ̃j,t and  t ̃ j,t . We simply assume a con-
stant annual bias during the boom years:
(18)  g ̃j,t =  g j,0 +  δ j g (min(t, t 1 ) −  t 0 ) −  δ j g max(t −  t 1 , 0),
  t ̃ j,t =  t j,0 +  δ j t(min(t, t 1 ) −  t 0 ) −  δ j t max(t −  t 1 , 0),
with  t 0 = 2002 and  t 1 = 2008 . Hence,  δ j g represents the average excess annual 
spending growth rate during the boom years. We interpret this drift as a political 
bias in spending decisions. In (18) we assume that the bias is reversed after 2008 
25 In equation (16) we use the lagged spread simply because it fits better, which probably reflects implementa-
tion lags in fiscal policy. This is not related to the identification of the model and our results are not sensitive to this 
detail. Note also that we are exploiting the fact that public expenditures and transfers do not move spreads other than 
through debt and so are excluded from the spread equation (16). This makes (16) a valid regression. 
Table 2—Coefficients Estimated with Instrumental Variables
 λ ρ, h  λ 0 ρ  λ g, ρ  λ h, ρ  λ rec, ρ 
−1.9 −2.8 2.1 1.2 18.2
 (0.18)  (0.54)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (5.8) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
1923Martin and PhiliPPon: the Great recession in the eurozoneVol. 107 no. 7
but our results are not sensitive to this choice.26 Countries display different degrees 
of spending bias during the boom years, and we want to analyze to what extent this 
spending drift during the boom years contributes to the crisis.
The parameters  γ n ,  γ ρ , and  γ ρ,  b g  and the spending drift coefficients  δ j given 
in Tables 3 and 4 are those that best replicate the observed dynamics of spend-
ing, taxes, and debt ( γ ρ,  b g  is only required for stationarity and does not matter for 
the dynamics that we study). The automatic fiscal rule in Table 3 is as expected. 
Governments want to stabilize employment but are constrained by their funding 
cost. For the biases, we focus on the four countries that are hit most harshly by the 
crisis, namely Spain, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal and on which we will run our 
counterfactuals. The bias necessary to reproduce the debt dynamics is concentrated 
on transfers rather than spending. We find that the model fits best with  δ g = 0 
and  δ t > 0 . This may reflect the high growth rate of wages of existing employees 
in the public sector and the impact of the pension system in the boom years (see 
Fernández Villaverde, Garicano, and Santos 2013). The bias is larger in Greece than 
in the other periphery countries. Finally, to reproduce the Greek debt dynamics, we 
need to take into account the Greek debt restructuring. Greece benefits from low 
interest rates, extended repayment periods for the EU and IMF rescue package, and 
a large reduction of outstanding debt. Altogether, we estimate that this is equivalent 
to a decrease of 50 points of GDP of debt in the budget constraint, mostly in 2012.
C. Fit of the Model
Figure 4 and Table 5 show the fit of the model. Figure 4 compares the actual 
and predicted series for nominal GDP, employment, public debt, and funding costs 
in the four periphery countries. The observed and predicted net exports are shown 
in Figure 1 in the online Appendix. For all predicted series, we add the difference 
26 The fact that it is reversed is not very important for our results. We could assume that the fiscal biases stay 
constant after  t 1 and our simulations would be similar. In fact, our counterfactual results would be stronger since the 
model would then choose a larger  γ ρ to fit the data. But, given that the tax rate  τ j is constant, this can create issues 
of debt sustainability if we simulate the model beyond 2012 and we assume that the spreads normalize. In practice 
we also see that governments are trying to reverse some of the spending decisions they made during the boom years. 
The change in political bias might come from new fiscal rules agreed at the EU level, from explicit requirements for 
countries in a program, or more broadly from a shift in attitudes and beliefs about fiscal responsibility. So we feel 
that the reversal assumption is both simple and safe and this is why we use it as our benchmark. 
Table 3—Fiscal Policy Coefficients
 γ n  γ ρ  γ ρ,  b g  
−0.2 −1.8 −0.02
Table 4—Biases in Government Spending (Percent)
 δ j t
Spain Greece Ireland Portugal
1.2 3.0 1.2 1.5
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Table 5—Goodness of Fit
ESP GRE IRL PRT
 y j, t 0.67 0.82 0.81 0.34
 n j, t 0.93 0.65 0.87 0.83
 p j, t 0.54 0.10 0.49 0.17
 b j, t g 0.75 0.93 0.97 0.98
 ρ j, t 0.94 0.93 0.88 0.82
 e j, t 0.87 0.45 0.55 0.56
Notes: Goodness of fit is measured as 1 − 2[ rss j /( tss j +  ˆ  tss j)], where  tss j and  ˆ  tss j are the total 
sum of squares in the data and in the model, and  rss j is the residual sum of squares. For instance, 
for GDP, we have   tss j ≡  ∑ t=2001 2012 ( y j,t −  y –j ) 2 , where  y j,t and  y –j are the actual GDP and its sam-
ple mean,  ˆ  tss j  ≡  ∑ t=2001 2012 ( y ˆj,t −  y ˆ–j ) 2 , and  rss j ≡  ∑ t=2001 2012 [  y j,t −  y ˆ j,t +  y ˆ–j −  y –j ] 2 , where  y ˆj,t is the 
prediction of the model and  y ˆ
–
j its sample mean. Hence, the goodness of fit is 1 if the model fits 
perfectly with the data, and 0 if orthogonal to the data.
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Figure 4. Model Fit
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between the mean of the data and the mean of the model. The model accounts well 
for the timing and amplitude of the boom and bust episodes.
Table 5 reports the goodness of fit of the model, defined as the share of the vari-
ance explained by the model. The goodness of fit is a number between −1 and 1. It is 
positive if the model helps reduce the unexplained variance, and it is 1 if the model 
fits perfectly. The fit is good especially for public debt and funding costs. It does 
well to reproduce the boom and bust for Ireland, Spain, and Greece where the rever-
sal is most dramatic. But there are some issues. The model overpredicts the boom 
and bust in Greece. The model overpredicts a little bit of the movements of Irish net 
exports. In Portugal, the model predicts too much movement in GDP and underes-
timates funding costs during the crisis. But, overall, the goodness of fit makes us 
confident that we can use the model to perform our counterfactual experiments.27
We are now ready to perform counterfactual experiments. Their validity clearly 
depends on the hypothesis that our estimated parameters are invariant, which relies 
on our identification strategy. We were most worried about the issues discussed in 
the identification section. For instance, because of the private leverage cycle, there 
is a high risk of overestimating the impact of the sudden stop. For the sudden stop, 
the obvious issue is that bad news can drive up both the debt and the spreads. We 
are fully aware that there are other potential biases that we ignore. We think that 
two issues in particular deserve explicit caveats. The first is that we ignore the con-
tagion from the risk of a particular country to the aggregate risk. This means that 
we keep the process  σ t constant across our experiment. For instance, this approach 
misses potential important learning effects by creditors, learning about exit risk (if 
Greece leaves, creditors learn a country can leave, and then reprice the risk of other 
countries), and learning about the implementation of EU rules that affects creditors’ 
recovery (in particular, of course, Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) 
and State Aid rules). The second is the assumption in the fiscal rule that the politi-
cal economy bias is driven by deep political structures and preferences that are not 
affected by our counterfactuals. This, we admit, is a limit to our analysis as one can 
argue that political institutions and preferences may themselves be affected by the 
financial crisis and our counterfactuals.
III. Counterfactual Experiments
The goal of this section is to provide counterfactual simulations of what would 
happen to Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal if they followed a different set of 
policies. We consider four counterfactuals:
•	 Fiscal	policy:	what	happens	with	more	conservative	fiscal	policies	before	2008?
•	 Macroprudential	 policies:	 what	 happens	 with	 limits	 on	 private	 debt	 before	
2008?
27 It might be worth emphasizing that the fit is absolutely not mechanical. Recall that our model has no produc-
tivity shock, which means that we do not extract any information from the actual GDP series. Another important 
fact, that we do not have the space to discuss here, is that all these results change dramatically if we use the wrong 
series. For instance, he goodness of fit turns negative if we do not use Trade in Value-Added to estimate foreign 
demand shocks, or (even worse) if we use the raw government spread as an estimate of  ρ , or if we do not account 
properly for bank recapitalization expenditures. 
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•	 Fiscal	and	macroprudential	policies:	what	happens	when	both	conservative	fis-
cal	and	macroprudential	policies	above	are	used?
•	 Monetary	policy:	what	happens	if	ECB	prevents	the	sudden	stop	in	2008?
For the counterfactual experiments, we use the equations of the model with the esti-
mated coefficients discussed above but feed it with different exogenous shocks. In 
all of our experiments, we report on the same graph the actual data and the predicted 
counterfactual series.28 The simulations generate series for public debt, private debt, 
employment, nominal GDP, net exports, and spreads on the period 2001–2012, using 
debt in 2000 as an initial point.
A. Counterfactual with a More Conservative Fiscal Policy in the Boom
How would countries have fared if they had followed more conservative fiscal 
policies	during	the	boom?	We	answer	this	question	by	setting		δ j t equal to 0 for the 
four periphery countries. For Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, all of the other bench-
mark parameters are left unchanged. For Greece, we need to deal with the debt relief 
issue. Given that the counterfactual conservative fiscal policy generates debt to GDP 
ratios much lower than in the data in 2011 and 2012, we assume that debt relief 
would not have taken place. Hence, for Greece the counterfactual is the combination 
of a more conservative fiscal policy but also the elimination of a transfer of around 
50 percent of nominal GDP in 2011–2012.
Figure 5 shows that the elimination of the spending bias dramatically changes the 
public debt accumulation in Greece (remember that this more conservative fiscal 
policy in Greece also means that it does not benefit from the debt relief at the end 
of the period). It also has a significant impact in Ireland and Spain and Portugal. 
28 The predicted series is defined as data + (model with counterfactual parameters − model with benchmark 
parameters).
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Figure 5. Conservative Fiscal Policy Experiment
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This large change in the public debt in turn reduces funding costs during the sudden 
stop in Ireland and Spain but a spike remains at the end of the period in Greece 
and to a lower extent in Portugal as shown in panel B of Figure 5 because Greece 
and Portugal still have a relatively high level of debt when hit by the sudden stop. 
Lower funding costs reduce the need for fiscal austerity during the bust in all four 
countries; this is partly the reason for the Spanish and Irish increases in public debt 
at the end of the period. This change in the profile of fiscal policy means that both 
the boom in GDP in the years 2000–2008 and the bust afterward are dampened in 
particular in Greece as shown in panel A of Figure 6. In our model, fiscal policy 
affects aggregate spending directly but also indirectly because a fiscal stimulus, by 
raising employment and disposable income of constrained borrowers, enables them 
to consume more. Unconstrained savers, however, do not react to an increase in 
government spending by raising nominal expenditures because being Ricardian they 
save more. Moreover, because a more conservative fiscal policy reduces the employ-
ment boom during the 2000–2008 period, it also lowers the increase in wages and 
prices and the competitiveness loss.
Panel B of Figure 6 shows that a conservative fiscal policy allows Greece to 
improve its employment dynamics. In the data, the employment loss was 20 per-
centage points (relative to the eurozone average) between 2008 and 2012. There is 
still an employment loss with the counterfactual policy during the crisis but a much 
lower one. The employment gains are lower for Spain, Ireland, and Portugal but 
still sizable and the counterfactual fiscal policy does not eliminate the boom-bust 
cycle in employment, but allows for an earlier exit from the recession, especially in 
Ireland. In Portugal, the conservative fiscal policy also stabilizes employment.
Finally, an important caveat to the conservative fiscal policy counterfactual in 
Spain and Ireland is that it requires a reduction in debt which we think is unrealistic. 
Ireland eliminates all its public debt by the end of the boom, and Spain reduces its 
public debt to around 20 percent of GDP. This suggests that fiscal policy is unlikely 
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Figure 6. Conservative Fiscal Policy Experiment
1928 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW july 2017
to be enough to stabilize an economy subject to a large buildup of private debt. We 
therefore now turn to macroprudential policies.
B. Counterfactual with Macroprudential Policies in the Boom
In this counterfactual we imagine that countries are able to prevent the private 
leverage boom. We assume that  b j, t 
h
 remains constant at its 2001 level. The impact 
in our model is to dampen the boom because impatient constrained households 
cannot increase their consumption through leverage.29 As explained earlier, it 
is important for this counterfactual to take into account the impact of such pol-
icy on the recapitalization of financial institutions during the bust as explained in 
Section IIB. Hence, we do not use recapitalization in the observed data ( reca p j, t data ) 
but instead a predicted series using equation (17). In our macroprudential experi-
ment we have  b j, 2007 h <  b j, 2007 h, data and the recapitalization needs are smaller. The tim-
ing of recapitalization is unchanged but all the values are scaled down.
The macroprudential policy in the boom therefore reduces recapitalization needs. 
Figure 7 shows that this macroprudential policy partially stabilizes GDP and employ-
ment in all four countries. This is the case in Ireland and Spain. Not surprisingly, 
given that there was little private leverage boom in Portugal, the impact of a counter-
factual macroprudential policy is small in this country. Given that the fiscal drifts are 
not affected in this counterfactual, the fiscal rule (that contains both a spending and 
transfer drift and a countercyclical component) induces a larger buildup of public 
debt (see panel A of Figure 8) than in a situation without  macroprudential policy. A 
second reason public debt increases in this counterfactual is the dampening of the 
boom in GDP and therefore tax revenues on the period 2002–2008.
29 Savers expenditures are affected by the path of private leverage only indirectly through its effect on spreads. 
Savers understand that the net present value (in euros) of their disposable income has not changed when income 
moves temporarily because of a change in private leverage. 
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An important result therefore is that larger public debt is substituted to private 
debt to achieve the employment target given that the fiscal bias is still present. There 
are two opposite effects on spreads: on the one hand the reduction in private lever-
age and induced bank recapitalization reduces spreads. On the other hand, the larger 
buildup of public debt pushes spreads upward. In Ireland and Spain, the first effect 
dominates as spreads are reduced in this counterfactual (see Figure 8). In the other 
two countries, this is not the case because spreads are driven mostly by the public 
debt levels. This counterfactual strongly suggests that macroprudential policies that 
do not come with a more prudent fiscal rule may not have been sufficient to generate 
a fiscally sustainable stabilization of employment. In this sense, macroprudential 
policies to constrain private leverage and prudent fiscal policies to constrain public 
debt are complements, not substitutes.
C. Counterfactual with Both Conservative Fiscal and Macroprudential  
Policies in the Boom
To illustrate this complementarity, we now show a counterfactual that combines 
both the conservative fiscal and macroprudential policies in the boom. As shown in 
Figures 9 and 10, this allows to better stabilize GDP, employment, public debt, and 
spreads. Interestingly in this case, the conservative fiscal policy does not generate an 
unrealistic elimination of public debt in Ireland.
D. Counterfactual with “Whatever It Takes” in 2008
In this counterfactual we ask the following question: what would have happened 
if the announcements of July 2012 (Mario Draghi’s declaration “Whatever it takes”) 
and September 2012 (the OMT program)	had	come	earlier?	These	announcements	
were successful in reducing the risk of a euro breakup, financial fragmentation, and 
the sudden stop. The experiment is to imagine that these actions were implemented 
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and successful in 2008 rather than 2012. Specifically, we assume that  σ t , the mean 
of the absolute value of spreads in the eurozone, in equation (16), is kept at its low 
2007 level from 2008 on. Note that this experiment in monetary policy is funda-
mentally different in our model from a standard monetary policy such as a reduction 
of interest rates. Remember that our analysis is always conducted on the dynamics 
of each country relative to the eurozone average so that we eliminate the impact 
of standard monetary policy which is common to all countries. Here, we analyze a 
policy that reduces the spreads in the eurozone. This experiment indeed effectively 
eliminates (in Spain and Ireland) or strongly reduces (in Greece and Portugal) the 
dramatic rise in funding costs as illustrated in panel A of Figure 11.
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The lower funding costs enable countries to dramatically improve nominal GDP 
and employment when the ECB policy starts in 2008 (see Figure 12). Finally, 
although not stabilized, public debt is similar to what is observed in the data as illus-
trated in Figure 11. This is due to larger fiscal receipts thanks to better GDP growth. 
Lower funding costs affect aggregate spending and employment through three chan-
nels: (i) savers do not slash spending as much (see the Euler equation (2)); (ii) the 
leverage of borrowers does not fall as much (see equation (14)) which in turn pos-
itively affects their spending; (iii) fiscal austerity is reduced as fiscal policy (16) is 
less constrained by the funding costs. In the online Appendix, we report experiments 
where we remove each channel sequentially to check the relative importance of 
each. Quantitatively, we find that the fiscal austerity channel is the most important 
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channel through which lower funding costs help stabilize employment. The two 
other channels are present but are less important. Our conclusion is therefore that, 
although it would not have stabilized public debt and would not have eliminated the 
negative consequences of private deleveraging, an early ECB intervention would 
have dramatically improved employment because fiscal austerity would have been 
averted in these countries.
IV. Conclusion
Understanding the dynamics of the eurozone is a major challenge for macro-
economics. Eurozone countries have experienced extraordinary levels of real and 
financial volatility. Unemployment rates have diverged to an extent that no one 
anticipated. While most observers recognize that private leverage, fiscal policy, sud-
den stops, and loss of competitiveness all played a role, it has proven challenging to 
analyze them jointly and even more difficult to disentangle them.
Our paper makes three contributions. We present a model that accounts simulta-
neously for domestic credit, fiscal policy, and current account dynamics. We create 
a dataset for 11 countries over 13 years that covers the variables of interest and deals 
with the various accounting issues. And we propose a new identification strategy that 
allows us to run counterfactual experiments regarding fiscal policy, macroprudential 
policy, and ECB interventions. The results from our counterfactual experiments on 
employment are summarized in Table 6. We report the actual change in employment 
and the change predicted by the structural model on the period 2008–2012, as in 
Figure 4. Stronger fiscal discipline during the boom would have made the recession 
less severe, especially in the case of Greece where we estimate that the employ-
ment loss between 2008 and 2012 would have been one-half of the observed one 
(again relative to the eurozone average). The impact is very large in Portugal too. 
In the case of Spain and even more so Ireland, the conservative fiscal policies in the 
boom help to partially stabilize employment but seem unrealistic since they require 
buying back almost the entire stock of public debt. A macroprudential policy to 
limit private leverage during the boom would have helped to stabilize employment 
especially in Ireland and Spain but would not have been sufficient. In the absence 
of a more prudent fiscal policy, this could have induced a larger buildup in public 
debt which would have partly undone the benefits of lower private debt. In Greece 
and Portugal, given the political fiscal bias, the gains from macroprudential policy 
would have been partly undone by looser fiscal policy in the boom. One lesson we 
take from this exercise is therefore that, due to political economy reasons, fiscal and 
macroprudential policies are complement rather than substitute when it comes to 
stabilizing the economy. In all four countries, the combination of conservative fiscal 
and macroprudential policies is the only one that enables them to stabilize employ-
ment and public debt. Another contribution of the paper is to show that the sudden 
stop episode dramatically worsened the crisis by constraining governments fiscal 
policy during the bust. If the ECB had successfully reduced the spreads early in the 
crisis, the employment losses between 2008 and 2012 would have been significantly 
smaller in all four countries. Without financial fragmentation, the eurozone would 
have experienced a boom-and-bust cycle similar to the one in the United States. 
However, this policy alone would not have avoided the large buildup in public debt.
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In a previous version of this article (Martin and Philippon 2014), we performed 
an additional counterfactual where we analyzed the impact of fiscal devaluation in 
2009 that enables periphery countries to recoup part of the competitiveness they 
had lost during lost during the boom years. For this exercise which is detailed in 
the online Appendix, we use a similar model but with a simpler Philipps curve and 
the fiscal devaluation is achieved through the combination of a valued-added tax 
(VAT) tax on all domestic expenditures (private and public) and a payroll subsidy 
on wages. The VAT is paid by firms and rebated to exporters. The payroll subsidy 
on labor (equal to the VAT rate) is paid to domestic firms. The impact of the fis-
cal devaluation is that export prices fall, foreign demand increases, while domestic 
prices for domestic consumers remain unchanged.30 In this counterfactual, we found 
that the increase in exports attenuates the fall in employment in all countries. This 
comes directly but also because both borrowers and savers consume more following 
the increase in foreign demand. Another effect of the fiscal devaluation is that the 
improved employment figures induce governments to cut spending and transfers. 
Because of this and because of the stimulative effect of the fiscal devaluation on 
income taxes, the trajectory of public debt is improved. This suggests that a condi-
tion for a successful fiscal adjustment is that countries can engineer such a change 
in relative prices even in a monetary union. We leave for further research to analyze 
more in detail the conditions of such a fiscal adjustment.
The contribution of our paper is to provide a coherent and quantitative frame-
work to study the eurozone crisis, and this requires integrating various strands of the 
literature. On the other hand, the weakness of our analysis is that we are forced to 
treat some deep issues rather superficially. In our view, political economy issues and 
sovereign default decisions deserve a much deeper analysis. In our model, political 
economy issues are captured by a bias in the fiscal rules. This is a useful starting 
point but it is not a satisfactory answer. For instance, Fernández Villaverde, Garicano, 
and Santos (2013) argue that financial booms can lead to weaker  monitoring and 
30 The fiscal devaluation is made fiscally neutral through a lump sum transfer to households so that the revenues 
from the VAT equal the cost of the payroll subsidy and the transfer. However, the indirect effects on income tax 
revenues that arise from the stimulative effects of a fiscal devaluation on output remain as would be the case of an 
exchange rate devaluation. 
Table 6—Counterfactual Employment Dynamics (Percent)
ESP GRE IRL PRT
Actual change in employment, 2008–2012 −17.3 −20.1 −16.1 −10.5
Counterfactual employment changes 2008–2012
Conservative fiscal policy during boom −7.9 −9.7 −8.5 −1.8
Macroprudential policy during boom −5.1 −14.1 −5.2 −6.5
Conservative fiscal and macroprudential +4.3 −3.6 +2.3 +2.2
No financial segmentation after 2008 −10.5 −8.2 −10.2 −4.2
Notes: Spain lost 17.3 percentage points of employment—more than the eurozone average—between 2008 and 
2012. If Spain had run a successful macroprudential policy during the boom, its employment loss between 2008 
and 2012 would have been −7.9 percentage points instead of −17.3. This prediction takes into account the fact that 
the baseline structural model does not fit perfectly. So we compute Δ n pred = Δ n counter (Δ n data /Δ n baseline ). If the 
baseline fit was perfect, Δ n data /Δ n baseline = 1, and this would simply be Δ n counter . Otherwise, we use the relative 
change. In the case of Greece, for instance, the model overpredicts Δn, so Δ n data /Δ n baseline < 1.
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a  deterioration in governance. Technically, this violates our identifying restriction 
since we assume that the political economy bias and the leverage boom do not affect 
each other directly. But more important, it shows that we need a deeper understand-
ing of the interaction between governments and financial markets. For tractability 
 reasons, we have also abstracted from a full analysis of investment both housing and 
business capital expenditures. This is clearly another avenue for future research.31
Similarly, we summarize sovereign default risk by a bond pricing equation. We 
are of course careful to estimate this equation with plausible instruments and to 
make sure that it fits well, which is critical for our experiments. But this clearly is 
not a satisfactory treatment of strategic sovereign default. Moreover, this approach 
does not help us to analyze reforms that would sever the link between sovereign 
risk and the private cost of funds. A sensible goal for the eurozone is to ensure that 
governments can default within the currency union and without destroying private 
financial markets. Understanding what is required to reach this goal is an important 
avenue for future research.
Appendix
A. Simulation of the Model
To run the simulations, we first need to set the initial conditions in a particular 
year. We use 2002 as our base year  t 0 .
 (i) Natural employment and prices (which are equal to wages) are normalized 
to  n ∗ = 1 and  p j,  t 0  h = 1 so nominal GDP is normalized in the base year 
to  y j,  t 0  = 1 .
 (ii) Variables set to their observed values are  b j,  t 0  h ,  t j,  t 0  ,  g j,  t 0  ,  b j,  t 0  g ,  b j,  t 0 −1 g ,  r j,  t 0  . 
Foreign demand is set using data on exports in value-added terms for 2001–
2012, normalized so that the level of foreign demand in 2002 satisfies goods 
market clearing in the model. The tax rate is constant at its 2002 level and 
equal to total government revenues as a percentage of GDP.
  (a)  Foreign demand  f j,  t 0  is chosen so as to match net exports  e j,  t 0  =  1 __  α j ( f j,  t 0  −  (1 −  α j )  ( y j,  t 0  −  g j,  t 0  ) ) .
  (b)  We get  τ j from the government budget constraint 
 g j,  t 0  +  t j,  t 0  −  τ j  y j,  t 0  =   b j,  t 0+1  
g  _____ 1 +  r j,  t 0  −  b j,  t 0  
g .
The structural shocks are  b ˆ j,t 
h
 ,  σ t ,  g ̃j,t and  t ̃ j,t as well as foreign nominal demand 
shocks  f j, t . For each country, we then simulate the path between 2001 and 2012 of 
nominal GDP  y j, t , employment  n j, t , wages  w j, t , net exports  e j, t , and public debt  b j, t g . 
31 Gourinchas, Philippon, and Vayanos (2017) introduce capital accumulation in a similar model for Greece. 
This opens a host of interesting and complicated issues. Despite these differences, their main conclusions for 
Greece are rather similar to ours. 
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Given the fiscal rule, the budget constraint determines the evolution of public debt. 
Given that the tax rate  τ j is constant but different for each country, debt sustainability 
is insured by our choice of parameters of the fiscal rule, in particular the fact that the 
spending drift is reversed after 2008.32
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